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THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR
RESTRAINT SINCE THE
PENTAGON PAPERS•
James L. Oakest

"The generalization that prior restraint is particularly
obnoxious in civil cases must yield to more particularistic
analysis." Paul Freund.••
I am extremely honored to have been asked to deliver the first
Kenneth Murray Lecture. The late Mr. Murray, I understand,
was a distinguished Detroit attorney who represented the Detroit Free Press and other media clients for forty years, and who
lectured regularly here at the Department of Communication. I
hope he would approve of what I have to say.
The purpose of this speech is to examine how the doctrine
against prior restraint has evolved since the Pentagon Papers
case. I intend to demonstrate that while traditional antipathy to
prior restraint has for the most part remained strong, several recent cases foreshadow a dangerous expansion of well-established
exceptions to the doctrine. To understand fully the significance
of these recent cases, I will begin this lecture with a general discussion of the historical origins of the doctrine against prior retraint. I will then proceed with a critical overview of the
landmark Pentagon Papers case, more formally called New York
Times Co. v. United States. 1 The remainder of the discussion
will focus on five Supreme Court cases decided since the Pentagon Papers decision - Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,• Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad,3 Young v. American Mini Theatres," Nebraska Press
• Delivered as the first KeMeth J. Munay Lecture at the Department of
Communication, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 18, 1982. This
lecture is reporduced without substantial change, except for the addition of
footnotes.The reader is asked to bear in mind that this address was written for the ear,
and not the eye.
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
•• Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rsv. 533, 539 (1951).
1. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiant).
2. 413 U.S. 376 (1972).
3. 420 U.S. 546 (1976).
4. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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Association v. Stuart, 11 and Snepp v. United States8 - as well
as three recent lower court decisions involving national security
considerations: United States v. Marchetti, 7 Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. v. Colby, 8 and United States v. The Progressive. 8
I.

THE ORIGINS OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

A prior restraint is an official restriction upon a communication before it is published. The restriction may be enacted by
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal, state,
or local government. Our modern doctrine against prior restraint
derives from our English forebears' antipathy toward licensing
procedures that required approval of publications in advance by
state or church authorities. That antipathy found perhaps its
highest expression in the poet Milton's Areopagitica, and its
most quoted legal affirmation in Blackstone, who wrote:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous· restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom
of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his
own timerity [sic]. 10
Traditional English antipathy to prior restraints was well in the
minds of our Founding Fathers at the time of the adoption of
the first amendment, for the colonists had lived with the continual fear of the Sedition Act of 1798;11 Peter Zenger's case11 was
5. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
6. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
7. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
8. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
9. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed mem., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979).
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (Oxford 1765).
11. The Sedition Act of 1798 was passed by a Federalist Congress to silence derogatory criticism of public officials and strengthen the government's position in an impending war with France. When Jefferson became President in 1801, he denounced the Act as
contrary to the first amendment and pardoned all persons who had been convicted or
fined under the Act. See generally J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S F'BTrERS (1956).
12. John Peter Zenger, the colonial printer and publisher of the New York Weekly
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not readily forgotten.
Yet it was not until 1931 that the Supreme Court invoked the
doctrine against prior restraint. In the landmark case of Near v.
Minnesota 13 the Court held that it was unconstitutional for
Minnesota to enjoin the publication of newspapers deemed "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" solely because they constituted a nuisance. 14 The Court did not say, however, that all
prior restraints on speech and press were incompatible with the
first amendment. Rather, Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion pointed out that in certain exceptional cases - obscenity,
incitement to violence, and opposition to the conduct of war the government could enjoin speech or press. 15 He stressed that
these exceptions were narrow, however, and that "immunity
from previous restraints or censorship" had historically been the
principal value of the first amendment. 18
Since Near, the doctrine of prior restraint has promoted responsibility in government by ensuring that the Government
does not suppress exposure of its errors, deceptions, or embarrassments. The doctrine has also worked to ensure that speech is
not readily subjected to the biases of the censor. 17 A system that
imposes prior restraints chills public communication. As Justice
Lewis Powell said in Pi,ttsburgh Press Co. v. Pi,ttsburgh Commission on Human Relations,1 8 "[t]he special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly
or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination [has been made] that it is unprotected by
the First Amendment." 19 Of course, in this respect, subsequent
punishment may be no better than prior restraint; it too can
chill speech and cause self-censorship, as New York Times Co. v.
Journal, was tried on August 4, 1735 for seditioua libel. Zenger· ultimately won a verdict
of "not guilty," and the case was immediately hailed as a landmark victory for the freedom of the press. Today the Zenger case is invoked frequently to demonstrate the importance of guarding against judicial tyranny in libel suite. See generally THE TRIAL OP
PETER ZENGER (V. Buranelli ed. 1957).
13. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
14. Id. at 701-02, 723.
15. Id. at 716.
16. Id.
17. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152 (Oxford 1765):
To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done,
both before and since the revolution, . . . is to subject all freedom of sentiment
to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of
all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.
18. 413 U.S. at 376 (1972).
19. Id. at 390.
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Sullivanso and its progeny recognized when they set constitutional limits on state libel laws. But as the late Alexander Bickel
put it: "[a] criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes."u
II.

THE PENTAGON

p APERS

CASE

The Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United
States, H was the first case on which I sat after coming to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals from district court. Along with
Judges Irving Kaufman and Wilfred Feinberg, I voted in favor
of the New York Times to uphold the late Judge Murray
Gurfein's ruling that the United States should be denied an injunction against the publication of the Pentagon Papers. While
our position was held by only a minority of the judges on the
circuit, ss the Supreme Court ultimately sided with us. I will
draw a little from my own recollections in discussing that case,
as well as from a paper I wrote after Judge Gurfein's death
about his participation in the case as his first decision on the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York."
The Pentagon Papers case left the courts little time to debate
where the outer limits of the doctrine of prior restraints lay. The
Supreme Court was about to take the final adjournment of its
term in June 1971, when the New York Times and the Washing,.
ton Post published their stories. Daniel Ellsberg had revealed to
the press the Government's own secret historical analysis of
American involvement in the undeclared, and by then unpopular, war in Vietnam. After waiting more than two days from the
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OJ' CONSENT 61 (1975).
Professor Vincent Blasi of the University of Michigan Law School contends that injunctions against speech are analogous to the historically disfavored practice of licensing
speech. Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L.
REv. 11, 93 (1981). He argues that both are based on the undemocratic premise that
"speech is an abnormally dangerous social force" that needs to be regulated. Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931). He finds, as I do, that such a premise cannot be
squared with our constitutional commitments to individual autonomy and limited government. Indeed, he and I would agree with Professor Freund that freedom of expression
may be "the fundamental end, reflecting the nature of man." Freund, The Supreme
Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 548 (1951).
22. 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'g per curiam, 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd per
curiam, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
23. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals voted five to three in favor of granting the
injunction. Id.
24. See Oakes, Judge Gurfein and the Pentagon Papers, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 5 (1980).
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time the first editions of the Times hit the streets/111 the United
States sought to enjoin further publication. The Government
also sought an injunction in federal court in the District of Columbia to prevent the Washington Post from publishing the Papers. In both cases the Government argued that publication
would violate the espionage statutes, reveal top-secret information, and cause irreparable injury to United States security
interests. 18
With each passing day of judicial consideration the significance and impact of the temporary restraining order that halted
publication of the Papers increased. Within the week, though,
Judge Gurfein had come down for the Times. Yet, given the Supreme Court's pending adjournment, our court could take only
seventy-two hours to consider the case on appeal. On first
glance, it appeared we would have insufficient time to evaluate a
record which included forty-seven volumes totaling 7,000 pages.
Nevertheless, contrary to Justice Blackmun's later statement
that the judges in New York "had not yet examined the basic
material" when the case reached the Supreme Court,17 we did
have the opportunity, even in that brief time, to examine the
documents and the testimony that the Government thought
most important.
The Government sought to justify the prior restraint by fitting
it within what it conceded was a narrow military security exception suggested by Justice Hughes in Near: "[when a nation is at
war], no one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops."18 The Government also argued that because the
documents were "stolen," they were subject to special inhibitory
treatment; thus the courts could restrain publication both under
the espionage statutes and by virtue of their inherent powers.
The Government further contended that the executive branch
had properly classified the documents top secret, that only the
0

25. The Government took no judicial action from the release of the first Sunday edition late Saturday night, June 12, until the third publication for Tuesday, June 15, had
gone to press on Tuesday, June 15. Perhaps the Government it.self debated whether the
documents were important enough in light of press freedoms to justify seeking a restraining order. But see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 760 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
26. This marked the first time that the executive branch had ever sought to impose a
prior restraint on - or even suggest application of the espionage statutes to - a major
newspaper.
27. 403 U.S. at 760 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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executive, not the court, could declassify the documents, 19 and
that the executive would need forty-five days to carry out the
declassification.
This last argument was considerably weakened by the Government'.s concession that there had been over-classification of
some material that was no longer "top secret." The Government
also acknowledged that the Court was not bound by the classification, even though it also said that there was a substantial executive privilege pertaining to military and foreign affairs
documents.
I approached the case with a few basic principles in mind: (1)
that even in contexts other than prior restraint, the exercise of
first amendment rights may generally be limited only where
there is a "clear and present danger"80 or a "grav[e] ... evil"81
to be avoided; (2) that it is a "chief purpose of the guaranty [of
freedom of the press] to prevent previous restraints on publication" by either the legislative or the executive branches;H (3)
that if the press is to fulfill its function of checking the govemment88 by ensuring freedom of political discussion" it must be
free from "such previous restraints upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments, and in early times here, to
stifle the efforts of patriots toward enlightening their fell ow subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers"; 85 (4) that any
prior restraint comes to court "bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity"88 so that the Government
"carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint"; 87 and (5) that even the war powers exercised by the commander-in-chief, however broad they may be,
are subject to "applicable constitutional limitations."88
29. The Government argued that under the existing case law, the court's function in
reviewing government classification was limited to determining whether it was arbitrary
or capricious. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Epstein v. Resor, 421
F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970).
30. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
31. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
32. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
33. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR. FDT.
REsEARCH J. 521, 580-83 (1977).
34. See Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Acts: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7
HOFSTRA L. REv. 655, 695 (1979) ("[A] representative government is functionally dependent upon freedom of political discUBBion". Id. at 695).
35. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313 (1825) (quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931)).
36. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1968).
37. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
38. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919)). See
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It seemed to me, in light of these principles, that Judge
Gurfein had refused quite correctly to enjoin the New York
Times's publication of the Pentagon Papers. Judge Gurfein,
himself a former OSS officer, concluded that while he could restrain a newspaper if it were "about to publish information or
documents absolutely vital to current national security,"•• the
Government - despite the in camera testimony of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff - had not shown "that the publication of these historical documents would seriously breach the
national security."•0
I admit I had some doubts about one cable proposed for publication, and about certain material relating to our involvement in
Thailand. I also recognized that the documents might have a serious impact on foreign policy decisions; indeed, while we heard
argument, the Senate voted to require withdrawal of our armed
forces from Vietnam within nine months after release of the ·
prisoners of war.• 1
Nevertheless, the Government failed to demonstrate that publication would vitally endanger the nation's security. The documents did not discuss matters after 1968. Thus any danger they
might have posed to national security had been lessened by the
passage of more than two years. Classification of the documents
did not automatically mean they were related to national defense.•• If anything, the Government's indiscriminate over-classification of documents41 cast serious doubt on just how vital the
material was to our military interests. Of the 7,000 pages involved, most of it was truly water over the dam. The Government maintained that publication would result in irreparable
damage to diplomatic relations with Saigon, Sweden, Australia,
and other countries. Moreover, the Government feared that publication would disclose our military command apparatus or "decision-making processes," and therefore rupture the worldwide
also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1957).
39. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 330.
40. Id. See Oakes, supra note 24, at 12-13.
41. S.J. Res. 89, 92d Cong., let Seas. (1971).
42. See United States v. Drummond, 353 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1013 (1966).
43. This over-classification was contrary to Executive Order 10501, 3 C.F.R. § 7 at
288-89, which requires that "proper control of dissemination of classified defense information shall be maintained at all times, including . . . severe limitation in the number of
such documents originated . . . . " The present administration bas proposed a relaxation
of the standards for classification so that it will be easier to classify documents as "secret." N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 3.

504

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:3

military balance. 44 It was, of course, difficult to determine
whether these dire predictions would prove correct. Yet, in my
view, Judge Gurfein was right to conclude that the Government
had not shown with reasonable certainty that publication posed
grave and immediate danger to our conduct of the undeclared
war.
Conversely, permitting publication of the Pentagon Papers
furthered the democratic ideal of free and open debate on issues
of public concern. The subject of the debate in this case was of
particular importance, for it concerned the origins of our involvement in a war that nearly everyone - including, perhaps,
even the President - wanted ended. At stake, in short, were the
very first amendment protections that made it possible for the
press to alert the public to the "duties of rulers."·H By allowing
publication the courts safeguarded these protections without
necessarily condoning the way the newspapers obtained their
material and without passing on the potential for post-publication criminal sanctions under the espionage laws;'8
The ultimate result of the Pentagon Papers case, a six to three
victory for the Times and the Post in the Supreme Court,47 was
properly hailed by the press and much of the legal world.
Clearly, publication of the Papers played an important role in
enlightening the public and bringing the Vietnam conflict to an
end some four years later. Perhaps, as Floyd Abrams has indicated, it "may also have paved the way for the public's reaction
to the Watergate transgressions" and "had direct, if utterly unpredictable, effects on the Nixon White House. "48 Doubtless it
has also led to a change in the relationship between press and
government - a change which, while largely for the good, may
also have resulted in greater hostility on the part of the press
and greater secrecy on the part of the Government.
It should be remembered, however, that the haste with which
the case was reviewed and the deep concern for national security
prompted three dissents in the Supreme Court. Yet those justices who voted with the majority also recognized the impor44. 328 F. Supp. at 327.
45. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. at 313 (quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 717 (1931)).
46. The Government had contended that the anti-espionage statutes, in particular 18
U.S.C. § 793(e) (Supp. IV 1980), gave the courts power to enjoin publication. Because
this statute punishes espionage as a crime, it is difficult to see how injunctive powers
could have been implied from it.
47. 403 U.S. at 714.
48. See Abrams, The Pentagon Papers, A Decade Later, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1981,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 76.
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ta.nee of national security. As Justice Brennan pointed out, the
issue at bar was not whether national security could ever justify
a prior restraint, but whether in this case the Government had
proved that publication would "inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of aJi event kindred to imperilling the
safety of a transport already at sea. "49 Similarly, Justices Stewart and White observed that the Government had failed to prove
that the disclosures would, in this particular instance, "surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. " 60 These three swing votes, therefore, leave
open the question of whether the Court would permit a prior
restraint if indeed it was clear that publication would result in
"direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" 61 to national security. Thus, while the Pentagon Papers case upheld the doctrine
against prior restraint, it also preserved the national security exception. It remains the key first amendment case of the decade.
One of the witnesses who originally appeared for the Government before Judge Gurfein has provided an interesting epilogue.
William B. Macomber, Undersecretary of State for Administration, cited the embarrassment of the Prime Minister of Australia
over revelations in the Papers concerning Australian troops sent
to fight in Vietnam: "I just don't see how we can conduct diplomacy with this kind of business going on." Today Mr. Macomber has another career as president of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, though I suspect this new career also
involves diplomacy. Recently, Mr. Macomber admitted that the
case was decided properly:
I think that, even though I have been a diplomat all my
life and nothing is more important to me than the security of the United States, the First Amendment is, in another way, the security of the United States. You can't
save something and take the heart out of it. 61
I must say I agree.
49.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 726-27 (1931) (Brennan, J., concuning).

50. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concuning).
51.

Id.

52. Abrams, supra note 48, at 72. See also Lewis, Freedom of the Press, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1981, at E21, col. 1.
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PRESERVING THE DOCTRINE AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINT:

Pittsburgh Press, Southeastern Promotions, American Mini
Theatres, AND Nebraska Press
Since the Pentagon Papers decision the Court has addressed
the issue of prior restraint in other co:ptexts. · Four cases merit
special attention; in two the Supreme Court struck down prior
restraints, and in two the Court upheld speech restrictions. Despite the mixed outcome, I think that in all of these decisions
"the barriers to prior restraint remain[ed] high and· the presumption against its use continue[d] intact."118
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,M the first of the two cases in which the Court upheld
speech restrictions, involved the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting the Pittsburgh Press from carrying helpwanted advertising columns classified "Male," "Female," and
"Male-Female." The Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations argued that the advertisements indicated and "aided" sex
discrimination in employment. 1111 The Commission ordered the
newspaper to classify its help-wanted advertisements without
reference to sex. 66 The Pittsburgh Press, in turn, argued that the
Commission's order violated the first amendment by restricting
the paper's editorial judgment. 117
The Supreme Court rejected the Press's argument and upheld
the order by a vote of five to four. The majorityM' viewed the
placement of want ads in a newspaper as commercial speech,119
which at the time was considered unprotected under the first
amendment. 60 The Pittsburgh Press Court distinguished the
Pentagon Papers case by noting that the latter involved "speculat[ion] as to the effect of publication" whereas Pittsburgh Press
53. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
54. 413 U.S. 376 (1972).
55. Id. at 380.
56. Id. at 379-80.
57. Id. at 381.
58. The majority consisted of the unusual combination of Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist.
59. 413 U.S. at 388.
60. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). But
see Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Regardless of whether the speech was protected, the Court held that the order was not
an unconstitutional prior restraint because it would not go into effect before the Supreme Court's final determination that the Pittsburgh Press's sex-designated advertising
was unprotected by the first amendment. 413 U.S. at 390.
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involved no speculation but rather "a continuing course of repetitive conduct. " 81 While the distinction is technically correct, I
think that the language used by the Court is dangerously broad,
for the simple reason that it seems to invite restraint of, for example, later articles in a series because the effects of earlier ones
are no longer speculative.81 Yet, as will be seen,88 this "continuing" language has not been read as broadly as it might be. Thus,
I do not think that in the final analysis the Court significantly
weakened the doctrine against prior restraint. Needless to say,
the press's function of checking government was not at stake in
Pittsburgh Press.
The second of the two cases, Young v. American Mini Theatres,84 upheld Detroit's "Anti-Skid-Row" zoning ordinances,
which prohibited adult theatres from locating within 1,000 feet
of two other adult establishments or within 500 feet of a residential area. "Adult" theatres were defined as those showing "specified sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas."ea Justice
Steven's opinion for a plurality of four Justices rejected the idea
that these zoning ordinances, which merely regulated the "place
where [adult] films may be exhibited,',ee could be prior restraints of expression. Instead, Justice Stevens concluded that
this place regulation was reasonable despite its differing treatment of "adult" and other kinds of content.
In contrast, Justice Stewart's dissent argued that Detroit
could not constitutionally prohibit speech on the basis of its
adult content. 87 Justice Stewart took issue with the plurality's
contention that "few of us would march our sons and daughters
off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual
Activities' exhibited in the theatres of our choice.'• I agree with
Justice Stewart on this point; the· plurality's willingness to accord lesser protection to speech that few of us would take up
61. 413 U.S. at 390.
62. As it turned out, the suppressed material in this instance remained unchanged
throughout the course of "repetitive conduct."
63. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
64. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
65. Id. at 53. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had found that the ordinances imposed a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication. Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 518 F.2d 1014, 1019-20 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
·66. 427 U.S. at 63.
67. Id. at 84 (Stewart, J., dissenting):
The Court today holds that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not prevent the city of Detroit from using a system of prior restraints and criminal
sanctions to enforce content-based restrictions on the geographic location of motion picture theaters that exhibit nonobscene but sexually oriented films.
68. Id. at 70. But see id. at 73 n.l (Powell, J., concurring).
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arms to defend is contrary to the values of individual autonomy
and freedom of choice implicit in the first amendment. Protection of unpopular speech lies at the core of the Bill of Rights.
Our Constitution values expression as an end in itself. Protection surely does not extend only to expression for which the nation would go to war.
Despite shortcomings in the majority's opinion, American
Mini Theatres did not weaken the doctrine against prior restraint. As in Pittsburgh Press, the issue of prior restraint was
never directly addressed. By classifying the disputed ordinance
as a "time, place and manner restriction," the Court avoided a
substantive discussion of the limits of the doctrine.
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 69 the first of the two
cases in which the Court struck down prior restraints, did little
more than reiterate the well-established principle that in the
area of marginal speech prior restraints are not acceptable unless a court can quickly determine whether or not the restrained
speech is actually unprotected. In Southeastern, the Court held
five to four that the board of the Chattanooga Municipal Theater could not bar presentation of the musical "Hair" without
providing "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. " 70 Insofar as the Chattanooga Board
failed to provide an adequate procedure for prompt judicial review, the Court held that its actions constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. 71
69. 420 U.S. 546 (1976).
70. Id. at 559 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
71. While under Near the doctrine against prior restraint would not apply to obscene
speech, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), the censors here had to prove obscenity. For over a decade since Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Court
had held that the censor must bear the burden of proving that the material was unprotected; a restraint could be imposed only temporarily while a judicial determination was
being made. Id. at 58. See also Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV.
L. REV. 518, 522-24 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 648, 656-59 (1955). These procedural safeguards were applied even in cases
involving arguably unprotected speech because, as the Court said in Southeastern
Promotions:
The presumption against prior restraints is heavier - and the degree of protection broader - than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law; a free society
prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law
than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in
advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are
formidable.
420 U.S. at 558-59. Justice White and Chief Justice Burger dissented not out of disagreement with this basic principle, but because they thought the district court's finding that
"Hair" violated the Chattanooga obscenity laws was sufficient to conclude the material
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Southeastern is interesting for what it did not do or say.
Neither the majority nor the dissenters alluded to the Pittsburgh Press Court's broad "continuous course of repetitive conduct" language. Yet surely the musical "Hair," with a set script,
libretto, production notes, and stage instructions, varied little
from one performance to another, even though the performers
had some discretion in the lines they delivered. Applying the
Pittsburgh Press standard, the Board's action would not have
constituted a prior restraint because there was no real speculation about what each successive show would contain. The
Court's failure to confront Pittsburgh Press may be an indication that the broad "repetitive conduct''. language will pose less
of a threat to the doctrine against prior restraint than originally
thought.
Nebraska Press Association u. Stuart12 was the only one of
the four cases discussed so far to involve a newspaper in its capacity as news-gatherer. In this widely hailed free press/fair trial
case, the Court unanimously struck down a state court injunction prohibiting pretrial publication of confessions which clearly
suggested that the defendant had murdered six members of a
family. 73 Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger observed that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on first
amendment rights," 7 ' particularly when applied to the reporting
of criminal proceedings, because "[t]he press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."711 Moreover, the opinion recognized that "the element of time is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of
bringing news to the public promptly."78 As in the Pentagon Pawas unprotected speech. Id. at 565.
72. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
73. Both the prosecution and defense counsel based their request for a protective
order on a 1966 Supreme Court ruling that overturned the conviction of an Ohio husband for the murder of his wife because of excessive publicity:
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court . . . .
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take
strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358, 362 (1966).
74. 427 U.S. at 559.
75. Id. at 559-60 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
76. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561.
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pers case, the Court emphasized that even if pretrial publicity
threatened the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial,
the danger posed was only speculative.
Nebraska Press did raise the question whether the presumption against prior restraint might give way to a weaker test that
would merely balance the intrinsic value of the speech against
its potential for harm. The Chief Justice, however, surprisingly
employed Learned Hand's Dennis test. In United States v. Dennis, 77 it will be recalled, the Second Circuit held that the Smith
Act did not unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of speech by
making it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the Government.
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority, looked back to
the "clear and present danger" test set forth by Justice Holmes
in 1919 in Schenck v. United States. 78 Judge Hand reformulated
that test in Dennis, writing that courts must consider whether
"the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. "79 In Nebraska Press, the Chief Justice reasoned that even
though no doubt existed about "the gravity of the evil pretrial
publicity can work," there was no demonstration of its
probability "with the degree of certainty our cases on prior restraint require."80 Thus, to the extent that the order prohibited
publication of judicial proceedings held in public, it was clearly
invalid; but where it prohibited publication based on information from outside sources, the "heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing. a prior restraint was not met . . . ." 81
Justice Brennan, joined by the concurring Justices Stewart
and Marshall, concluded that trial gag orders were per se impermissible prior restraints. The Brennan opinion viewed the
"heavy burden" language of earlier prior restraint cases to mean
that the party seeking to impose the restraint must first show
that its purpose fits within one of the narrowly defined exceptions set forth in Near: military security, obscenity, or incitement to violence. 81 If restraint of alleged obscenity or incitement
is sought, procedural safeguards should be required for a prompt
judicial determination that the speech is not protected. Similarly, if restraint of an alleged danger to military security is
sought, it must be clear that disclosure "will surely result in di77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on opinion below, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
183 F.2d at 212.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 570.
Id. (quoting Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1976)).
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rect, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people . . . . " 83 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall recognized that if the test for imposing prior restraints was based on
a subjective assessment of the harm which would accrue to criminal defendants; judges would "inevitably [be] interject[ed] ...
at all levels into censorship roles that are simply inappropriate
and impermissible under the First Amendment."8 '
While Nebraska Press was widely hailed as the most important victory for freedom of the press since the Pentagon Papers,
the difference between the Chief Justice's opinion and Justice
Brennan's opinion is well worth noting. The most notable feature of the Burger opinion is that it does not state a general rule,
but instead applies an ad hoc balancing test to decide first
amendment cases, even in the prior restraint area. The use of
the Hand test is problematic for several reasons. First, Dennis
did not involve a prior restraint. n Second, the Hand standard is
"notoriously amorphous. " 86 As Benno Schmidt noted in a Stanford Law Review symposium, the test has "not enjoyed good repute as First Amendment doctrine, " 87 and, as my mentor Paul
Freund pointed out, the Hand test has been "subject to loose
construction" and has "countenanc[ed] speculation in historical
futures, the most dangerous form of gambling with the liberty of
speech. " 88
Thus, it seems to me that this feature of the case is a lurking
danger, despite the immediate outcome of the case in favor of
the press. Like Professor Blasi, I take a "pathological" view
when it comes to "tinkering" with first amendment freedoms; I
worry about what some future court will do with the tinkering
language. One's fears are to some extent allayed insofar as Nebraska Press was handed down in a frantic final week of one of
the most crowded terms in the Court's history. Professor
Schmidt has aptly noted that it was one of fifty-six cases decided with full-dress opinions in the final month of a term of
court that was almost "capsized" by the complicated case of
83. Id. at 593 (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730
(1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
84. Id. at 594-95.
85. In Dennis the issue was the punishment of the petitioner under the Smith Act
after the alleged unprotected speech had been communicated to the public.
86. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 460 (1977).
87. Id. at 460.
88. Freund, The Great Disorder of Speech, 44 AM. SCHOLAR 541, 545 (1975), quoted
in Schmidt, supra note 86, at 460 n.133.
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Buckley v. Valeo. 89 Clearly then, it remains an open question
whether ad hoc balancing or a per se rule apply to the doctrine
against prior restraint in fields such as free press and fair trial.
As Alexander Bickel warned after the Pentagon Papers decision,
we should beware lest the appearance of extending freedom "endanger[s] an assumed freedom, which appeared limitless because
its limits were untried. " 90

IV.

PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION

A. Former Agents Marchetti and Snepp
Turning back to national security as a ground for prior restraint, I will now examine several recent cases that, to a limited
extent, pose a serious challenge to the doctrine against prior restraint. All involve attempts by the Central Intelligence Agency
to impose pre-publication restrictions on its former employees.
In United States v. Marchetti 91 the CIA sought to enjoin its
former agent, Victor Marchetti, from publishing a book based on
his experiences in the Agency. Part of the material Marchetti
used for his book was drawn from classified documents. A preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal. 911 Each of the seven publishers to whom Marchetti had submitted his uncensored manuscript were ordered to halt publication. The court agreed with
Marchetti that the first amendment and the doctrine against
prior restraints "limits the extent to which the United States,
contractually or otherwise, may impose secrecy requirements
upon its employees and enforce them with a system of prior censorship. " 98 Nonetheless, in this instance the court concluded
that "we are . . . concerned with secret information touching
upon the national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs
114
• • • ."
The risk of harm from exposure "is so great and maintenance of the confidentiality of the information so necessary"
that ordinary criminal sanctions might not suffice. 911 The court
89. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Schmidt, supra note 86, at 475.
90. Bickel, The Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open First Amendment, 54
TARIES 60, 61 (1972), quoted in Schmidt, supra note 86, at 476 n.205.
91. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
92. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
93. Id. at 1313.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1317.
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reasoned further that secrecy agreements with employees provided a reasonable means for government agencies to protect internal secrets. The court limited its holding to the disclosure of
classified information and required the CIA to act promptly to
approve or disapprove any material submitted to it by Marchetti. 98 The court declined, however, to review the system of classification of documents and information, finding it a matter of
"the executive function [which was] beyond the scope of judicial
review. " 97
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby98 was Marchetti's case on remand to the district court. The CIA initially claimed that 339
items contained classified information; gradually the number
was reduced to 168.99 The court of appeals in Knopf candidly
admitted: "[w]hen writing ... Marchetti, we did not foresee the
problems as they developed in the district court. We had not
envisioned any problem of identifying classified information embodied in a document produced from the files of such an agency
as the CIA and marked 'Top Secret' or 'Confidential.' " 100 The
court remanded the case again, stating that for the Government
to meet its burden of proof it need only show that the information was "classifiable"101 - the meaning of which is unclear, at
best. Meanwhile, Knopf published the book with the 168 disputed items omitted.
The Knopf decision is significant because the court did not
apply the national security standard of "direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people" that the Stewart, White, and Brennan opinions in the Pentagon Papers case109
would have required. In the court's view, the secrecy agreements
Marchetti signed with the CIA - requiring him to submit his
96. Id. at 1318.
97. Id. at 1317. Nevertheless, the court did give Marchetti the right to judicial review
of any action disapproving publication. Id.
98. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
99. · In the district court, four deputy directors of the CIA testified that the information contained in 168 of the items was classified. This testimony, however, was too general and undocumented to satisfy the district judge. Only after the United States offered
what the court of appeals called "a batch of documents" did the district judge find that
the information embodied in 26 of the 168 items sought to be deleted had actually been
classified while Marchetti was an agent. 509 F.2d at 1365-66.
100. Id. at 1367. The court was rather apologetic for having "perhaps misled" the district judge into imposing an "unreasonable and improper burden of proof of classification," id., when in fact "the government was required to show no more than that each
deletion disclosed information which was required to be classified in any degree and
which was contained in a document bearing a classification stamp." Id. at 1368.
101. Id. at 1370.
102. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) {per curiam)
{White, J., concurring).
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manuscript to the CIA for authorization and allowing the CIA to
withhold authorization for classified information - "effectively
relinquished his First Amendment rights," 103 and made the issue
of national security irrelevant.
This reliance on secrecy agreements is troubling for several
reasons. First, under the agreement it is exceedingly easy for the
CIA to establish that a disputed document is classified; if the
Agency can produce a classified document containing references
to the information in question, the dispute will be resolved in its
· favor. Second, requirements found in secrecy agreements, such
as loyalty oaths, are frequently overbroad. As a result, these
agreements prohibit publication of information that in no way
endangers government security interests. Third, secrecy agreements can make a mockery of the reasonableness standards
which are generally applied to government employment contracts.10• Regardless of the facts of a particular case, it is a simple matter for any court to conclude, as the Fourth Circuit did
here, that the contract was reasonable because "information
highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and the national
defense was involved, " 1011 even though no showing had been
made that the specific danger was of sufficient gravity and imminence to warrant prior restraint. 108
In short, the application of first amendment law in Marchetti
and Knopf is highly questionable; classification was accorded too
great a presumption of regularity, and secrecy agreements were
not held to a standard of reasonableness that required a showing
of harm to national interests from disclosure.
In a related case, Snepp v. United States, 107 CIA agent Frank
Snepp, like Marchetti, signed secrecy agreements. Although the
material in Snepp's book on CIA activity in Vietnam was not
classified, the CIA brought an action against him for violating an
agreement not to "publish or participate in the publication of
any information or material relating to the Agency . . . without
103. Knopf, 509 F.2d at 1370.
104. See United States Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 74, 101 (1947).
105. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1316.
106. In conspiracy cases involving an alleged disclosure of secret documents, the standard has long been that the Government must show more than that a classified document was simply disclosed; it must also show that disclosure resulted in damage to national security. See United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236, 239 n.2 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962); United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966); see also Goren v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 31
(1941).
107. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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specific prior approval by the Agency." 10s Snepp's book, Decent
Interval, concerned the fall of Vietnam. The Government conceded that the book did not divulge classified intelligence, and
consequently publication was not restrained. Snepp had failed,
however, to submit his book for pre-publication review, as his
secrecy agreement required. The Supreme Court agreed with the
district court that Snepp had both deliberately breached the
agreement and his position of trust with the CIA and misled
CIA officials into believing that he would submit the book for
pre-publication review. The Court reasoned that because the
Government has "a compelling interest in protecting both the
secrecy of information important to our national security and
the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service,"109 it could require all
information obtained through CIA employment to pass pre-publication clearance. In the Court's view this "licensing system"
was needed to filter out material that even risked exposure of
"classified information and confidential sources."110
The remedy designed by the Snepp Court was to enjoin
Snepp from future violations and place all his profits in a constructive trust. Yet the Court was less concerned with imposing
a punishment after the fact than with enforcing a system of
prior restraint that would "ensure in advance . . . that information detrimental to [the] national interest is not published. nm
By relying on Snepp's secrecy agreement the Court managed to
circumvent the doctrine against prior restraint entirely; both the
doctrine and its established exceptions, the majority concluded,
were simply "inapplicable. " 112
108. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508.
109. Id. at 509 n.3. This was a consideration that Justice Harlan had alluded to in the
Pentagon Papers case. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752, 754
(1971) (per curiam) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110. 444 U.S. at 512.
111. Id. at 513 n.8.
112. Id. at 509 n.3. The Court did suggest that without the agreement, the CIA
"would have borne the burden of seeking an injunction against publication," id. at 513
n.8, but unlike the Pentagon Papers Court, the Snepp Court did not discuss the nature
of that burden.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, characterized
the CIA secrecy covenant as a prior restraint on free speech. Id. at 526 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that there should be "an especially heavy burden on
the censor" to justify such a drastic remedy as a constructive trust. Id. The majority's
suggestion that even unclassified information might be "identified as harmful" did not
properly set forth this burden. Id. at 522. Citing the Pentagon Papers case and Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), Justice Stevens noted that
The mere fact that the Agency has the authority to review the test of a critical
book in search of classified information before it is published is bound to have
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Thus, the cases of former agents Marchetti and Snepp reveal
a profound conflict between national security interests and the
first amendment. 113 One may readily agree with the need for secrecy in intelligence-gathering activities without necessarily believing that all publications by former employees discussing intelligence operations should be subject to censorship. The
Fourth Circuit cases suggest that all "classifiable" information,
however defined, may be withheld from public consideration.
The Snepp case, in particular, appears to establish that even secrecy contracts are unnecessary for the Government to secure an
injunction; a Government determination of mere probable harm
may suffice to disapprove publication. Read in that light, Snepp
reminds one that all liberty hangs by very precious threads; "national security" is an expandible, not a fixed, concept..

B.

The Progressive

I end with United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 114 a case
that is in some ways a mirror image of the Pentagon Papers decision. The Progressive proposed to publish an article by Howard Morland, an investigative reporter, entitled "The H-Bomb
Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It."1111 Much of the
significant information in the article was gleaned from Dr. Edward Teller's Encyclopedia Americana article on the hydrogen
bomb. 116 While the Government was well aware that a Progresan inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form of prior restraint that would
not be tolerated in other contexts.
Id. at 526 n.17. Finally, Justice Stevens's dissent conceded that the "national interest in
maintaining an effective intelligence service" might justify an exception to the doctrine
against prior restraint, but stressed that the boundaries of such an exception must be
carefully defined:
In view of the national interest in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I
am not prepared to say that the restraint is necessarily intolerable in this context. I am, however, prepared to say that, certiorari having been granted, the
issue surely should not be resolved in the absence of full briefing and argument.
Id.
113. See generally Kalijarvi and Wallace, Executive Authority to Impose Prior Restraint, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 468, 492 (1973) (defining eight substantive fields in which it is
generally agreed that some measure of secrecy is essential). See also THE FEDERALIST,
No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
114. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), appeal dismissed mem., 610 F.2d 819 (7th
Cir. 1979).
115. The article was later published under the title: The H-Bomb Secret: To Know
How ls to Ask Why, THE PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 1978, at 60.
116. Teller, Hydrogen Bomb, 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 654 (1978). See affidavit of
Thomas Postel quoted in Note, United States v. Progressive, Inc.: The Faustian Bargain
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sive editor, Samuel Day, Jr., had visited three government production facilities with the consent of the Department of Energy, 117 it nevertheless sought a district court injunction on the
grounds that the article constituted "Restricted Data" under the
Atomic Energy Act. 118 .
The district court 119 issued a preliminary injunction entirely
on the basis of affidavits and in camera documents presented by
the Government. Noting that first amendment rights are not absolute,120 the court held that the material proposed for publication fell within Near's national security exception to the doctrine against prior restraint: "I want to think a long, hard time
before I'd give a hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin. It appears to me
that is what we're doing here.m 21 The court concluded that the
concepts in the article were neither in the public domain 122 nor
declassified, 128 and that "no plausible reason [exists] why the
public needs to know the technical details about hydrogen bomb
construction to carry on an informed debate on this issue." 124
The district court went on to distinguish the Pentagon Papers
case from the one at bar by pointing out that in the former, historical events did not impose a threat of future harm. Unlike the
Pentagon Papers, the Progressive article threatened "direct, immediate, and irreparable" damage to the country and thus fell
within the national security exception to the doctrine against
prior restraint. 1211 The court's findings of fact, however, were not
consistent with its conclusion; the testimony suggested only that
the article "could possibly" provide information allowing a medium-sized nation to develop a bomb more quickly and "could"increase the number of nations with the bomb. 126 Using speculative harm to justify prior restraint, I submit, cannot be squared
and the First Amendment, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 538, 557-58 n.118 (1980).
117. In addition to these visits by Day, Morland continued to conduct interviews
with plant officials, as well as photograph weapons on display in the National Atomic
Museum. Note, A Journalist's View of The Progressive Case: A Look at the Press, Prior
Restraint, and the First Amendment from the Pentagon Papers to the Future, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1165, 1166-67 (1980).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (making it a crime to disclose
restricted data with the intent to harm the United States or "with reason to believe" the
data will be used to injure the United States or further a foreign nation).
119. The case was heard in the United States Federal District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin.
120. 467 F. Supp. at 992.
121. Note, supra note 117, at 1166.
122. 467 F. Supp. at 993.
123. Id. at 998.
124. Id. at 994.
125. Id. at 994.
126. Id. at 990, 993, 999.
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with the Pentagon Papers case. While it is logically consistent
with the language of the Dennis test - although neither Dennis
nor the ·balancing language in Nebraska Press were mentioned
in the Progressive opinion - it has the undesirable consequence
of permitting publication to be enjoined even when there is only
a minimal chance that harm will result. Where the cost of a potential disaster is high, as with nuclear war, courts using the
Progressive test will invariably err on the side of restraining
publication. 127
It is difficult even at this stage to judge the wisdom of the
Progressive's initial decision to publish the article. After Three
Mile Island and reports of missing uranium, however, it may be
well for journalists to fight the tendency to use the Atomic Energy Act or its equivalent to stifle policy debate. My view is that
the court should not have granted an injunction simply on the
basis of affidavits and documentation. What the Supreme Court
would do with such a case, or with a restraint against an article
on recombinant DNA, bacteriological warfare, or any other nascent technology with a potential for abuse, remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

I leave you with Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court
in United States v. Robel, 118 a case upholding the right of a
Communist to work in a defense plant. Justice Warren wrote:
Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of
defending those values and ideas which set this Nation
apart. For almost two centuries, our country has taken
singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its
Constitution, and the most cherished of those ideals
have found expression in the First Amendment. It would
indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we
would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties
. . . which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile. ui9
127. In this particular instance, however, the disputed material was eventually published. When another Wisconsin paper printed similar information obtained by a different author on September 26, 1979, Press Connection, Sept. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 1, the
Government dropped its case against the Progressive. Most of the in camera documents
submitted by the Government were released by stipulation, although some "classified"
and some "sensitive" material remained under seal. See Note, supra note 17, at 1174.
128. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
129. Id. at 264.
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In my opinion the press should not be regarded only as a
check on inefficient or dishonest government. It is important
that it also be viewed as a powerful vehicle for the effective
functioning of a government that by definition is democratic in
nature. The doctrine against prior restraints preserves the "robust, wide-open" debate that is essential to freedom. 130 I am
concerned, however, that as Thomas Emerson reminded us in
1955, "unless the doctrine of prior restraint is given a more rational and comprehensive form, it is likely to be whittled away
in future decisions. " 131
Given the cycle of contraction and expansion that has marked
other doctrines of similar constitutional magnitude, it is pointless to predict how the Court will decide future prior restraint
cases. Invariably the tensions between the doctrine against prior
restraint and its Near exceptions will continue to result in linedrawing which, as Justice Holmes said in another context, "is so
far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a little
further to the one side or to the other." 182 Fortunately, the first
amendment is protected by alert defenders, some of whom have
powerful voices and deep pockets; there is still good reason to
hope - and expect - that its values will be carefully preserved.

130. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 270 (1964).
131. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP.
(1955).
132. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 654 (1873).
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